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to make hearing their applications physically possible, these consti-





Federal Income Taxation-The Unhappy Circumstance of
Liquidation And Reincorporation
Two recent decisions of the Tax Court, David T. Grubbs' and
Joseph C. Gallagher,2 illustrate the problems which confront the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue when he attempts to tax distri-
butions of accumulated earnings and profits3 at ordinary income tax
rates when such distributions occur in a transaction of preincorpora-
tion-liquidation or liquidation-reincorporation.
In a typical situation the corporation will have been in business
for some time and have accumulated at least a material amount of
earnings and profits. Assume that a new corporate entity is formed
and that the essential operating assets of the old corporation are
transferred to the new corporation for voting stock. The share-
holders then liquidate the old corporation and distribute the new
corporation's stock and any remaining cash and other liquid assets
to the stockholders of the old corporation (preincorporation-liquida-
tion).4
If the device is successful there will be a complete liquidation
'39 T.C. No. 5 (Oct. 8, 1962).
'39 T.C. No. 13 (Oct. 17, 1962). An appeal to the Ninth Circuit was
dismissed.
This term (earnings and profits) is not defined in the 1954 Code; how-
ever, § 312 describes the effect some transactions have on earnings and
profits. For purposes of this note, earnings and profits can be thought of as
the retained earnings or earned surplus of the corporation, without regard to
the fact that some transactions may be recorded differently for federal tax
purposes than for corporate book purposes. See generally STANLEY & KIL-
cULLEN, THE FEDERAL INcOME TAx § 301 at 119 (4th ed. 1961); WIXON,
ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK § 22 (4th ed. 1960).
'A similar problem is raised when the old corporation is liquidated, dis-
tributing its cash, liquid and operating assets to its shareholders, part or all
of whom then reincorporate the operating assets and continue the business
in corporate form (liquidation-reincorporation). See generally Kuhn, Liqui-
dation and Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code, 51 GEG. L.J. 96 (1962);
Rice, When is a Liquidation Not a Liquidation for Federal Income Tax Pur-
poses?, 8 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1956).
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under section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,' or at least
a partial liquidation under section 346," with the distributees acquir-
ing the assets at a stepped-up basis (fair market value) under section
334; and, with the stepped-up basis continuing in the new corpora-
tion under section 362(a).' In such a case the distributions of cash
and other property would be treated as liquidating distributions un-
der section 331,8 therefore receiving sale or exchange treatment. The
probable purpose of such a transaction is to withdraw accumulated
earnings and profits from the old corporation at the lower capital
gain rates and to continue to operate the same business assets in a
corporate form with essentially the same ownership. The alterna-
tive method for withdrawing these accumulated earnings and profits
is for the corporation to declare a dividend, with resulting taxation
at ordinary income tax rates under sections 61 (a), 301 (c) (1), and
316(a) of the 1954 Code.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337, provides "(a).... If-
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after
June 22, 1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adop-
tion of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in com-
plete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or
exchange by it of property within such 12-month period." See generally
Rice, Problems in Section 337 Liquidations, N.Y.U. 20THl INST. ON FED. TAX
939 (1962); Note, 76 HARV. L. REv. 780 (1963).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 346, provides "(a).... For purposes of this
subchapter, a distribution shall be treated as in partial liquidation of a cor-
poration if-
(1) the distribution is one of a series of distributions in redemp-
tion of all of the stock of the corporation pursuant to a plan; or
(2) the distribution is not essentially equivalent to a dividend, isin redemption of a part of the stock of the corporation pursuant to a plan,
and occurs within the taxable year in which the plan is adopted or within the
succeeding taxable year...."
See generally Bittker, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 9 STAN. L. REV. 13 (1956).
'INT. R v. CoDE oF 1954, § 334, states that "(a).... If property is re-
ceived in a distribution in partial or complete liquidation . . . , and if gain
or loss is recognized on receipt of such property, then the basis of theproperty in the hands of the distributee shall be the fair market value of suchproperty at the time of the distribution." And in INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954,
§ 362(a), it is provided that "if property was acquired.., by a corporation-
(1) in connection with a transaction to which section 351 (relating
to transfer of property to corporation controlled by transferor) applies, or(2) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital, then the
basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor, in-creased in the amount of gain recognized to the transferor on such transfer."
'INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 331, provides "(a)....
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In Grubbs the approach of the Commissioner and decision in the
case adhere to case law principles developed or established under the
1939 Code." There, G and B along with fourteen other shareholders
owned the selling corporation. In accordance with a plan of reorgani-
(1) .... Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corpora-
tion shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock.
(2) .... Amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corpora-
tion.., shall be treated as in part or full payment in exchange for the stock.
(b) .... Section 301 (relating to effects on shareholder of distribu-
tions of property) shall not apply to any distribution of property in partial
or complete liquidation." This rule originated in Hellmich v. Hellman, 276
U.S. 233 (1928).
' "The opportunities for minimizing taxes illustrated [by such a transac-
tion] . . . presumably arise from a policy determination by Congress that
when a corporate enterprise is ended and the participants go their separate
ways, the gains from the enterprise should be taxed on a capital gain basis
and the slate wiped clean with respect to future use of the assets. It would
seem reasonable to assume, however, that Congress intended this result only
in cases where the enterprise was terminated in some substantial sense; that
it did not intend to permit stockholders to have tax advantages in cases
where their interests still remained 'in solution' in an enterprise which sup-
planted the one which had been liquidated. The problem faced by the courts
in this area . . . is . . . one of drawing a line." Rice, When Is a Liquida-
tion Not a Liquidation for Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 8 STAN. L. REV.
208, 210-11 (1956). See generally Schwartz, Reincorporations Under the
1954 Code, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 159 (1962).
'o The traditional approach of the Commissioner prior to the enactment
of the 1954 Code was to assert that there had been a reorganization under
§ 112(g) (1) (D) of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 40, quoted in part note 18 infra
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D)). When he won, the Com-
missioner succeeded in forcing the new corporation to take the transferred
property at the same basis it had in the hands of the old corporation; and, in
addition the Commissioner was able to tax "boot" distributions to the extent
of accumulated earnings and profits at ordinary income tax rates under
§ 112(c) of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 39 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 356).
See Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 836 (1961); Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949);
Heller v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945), affirming 2 T.C. 371
(1943), cert denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945); Ethel K. Lesser, 26 T.C. 306
(1956); James G. Murrin, 24 T.C. 502 (1955); Pebble Springs Distilling
Co., 23 T.C. 196 (1954), aff'd, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 836 (1956); William M. Liddon, 22 T.C. 1220 (1954), aff'd on
this issue, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956);
Richard H. Survaunt, 5 T.C. 665 (1945), aff'd, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir.
1947).
However, the Commissioner did not always win on the "reorganization"
theory. See United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953); Braicks v. Henricksen, 43 F. Supp. 254 (W.D.
Wash. 1942), aff'd, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943); Austin Transit, Inc., 20
T.C. 849 (1953).
See generally 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20.92 (rev. ed.
1957).
19 The plan of reorganization is a requirement of INT. Rav. CODE OF
1954, § 354(a) (1). See generally MERTENS, CODE COMMENTARY, FEDERAL
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zation" "assets... were transferred to... [Buyer] and the stock in
... [Seller] was surrendered and the stockholders received cash and
acquired stock in [Buyer]. "12 All stock of Seller was redeemed
by it except 350 shares held by B. The transaction thus left G and
the other fourteen shareholders of Seller holding pro rata shares
in the new corporation plus cash distributions made by the old cor-
poration in connection with the redemption of its stock.", B, how-
ever, remained as sole owner of the corporate shell of the selling
corporation.
14
On these facts the Commissioner asserted that the several trans-
actions which accompanied the transfer of the old corporation's
business to the new corporation "amount to a reorganization under
which the stockholders of the old corporation exchanged their stock
for stock in the new corporation and cash and that the exchange had
the effect of the distribution of a dividend."'"
The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's position, finding
a reorganization under section 3 6 8(a) (1) (D)' 0 by applying the
INcOME TAXATION §354(a)(1):3 (1955); 3 MEmRTNs, FEDERAL INcOME
TAXATION §20.95 (rev. ed. 1957); Manning, "Ii Pursuance of the Plan
of Reorganization": The Scope of the Reorganization Provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1959).
1239 T.C. No. 5 at 7.
The new corporation was authorized to issue 1,000 shares of Class Acommon stock and twice that amount of Class B common stock. Each with
equal voting rights. In addition to the transfer of assets from the old cor-
poration to the Buyer, which was for 750 shares of Class B common, B re-
ceived an additional 150 shares of Class A common in exchange for the
assets and liabilities of a sole proprietorship he had been operating since
1956. 39 T.C. No. 5 at 3, 5.
" There was, therefore, no actual distribution by Seller to B. He merely
remained as the sole owner of the corporation through which he planned
thereafter to conduct a finance business. The old corporation had been en-
gaged primarily in the automobile dealership business, and had not made
any loans. The finance business was, therefore, a new business for Seller.
39 T.C. No. 5 at 10.
"539 T.C. No. 5 at 8.
20 "(a)
(1) ... the term 'reorganization' means...,
(D) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to
another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one
or more of its shareholders (including persons who were shareholders im-mediately before the transfer), or any combination thereof, is in control
of the corporation to which the assets are transferred; but only if, in
pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which theassets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under
section 354... or 356." INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D).
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step-transaction theory." This section provides that a "D" reor-
"'Taxpayer's "contention would treat the redemption of the stock of
the old corporation as an isolated transaction. But when the same stock-
holders continue to carry on the same business in corporate form through
another corporation, the several steps may not be so isolated. The conse-
quences of the rearrangement must be judged by the total effect. Where a
redemption of stock is one of a series of steps in a reorganization, the tax treat-
ment is governed by the provisions of law relating to reorganizations." 39 T.C.
No. 5 at 9. Under the step-transaction theory the court considers the liquida-
tion as a step in the reorganization. This allows application of the reorgani-
zation provisions to a liquidation-reincorporation transaction. The theory
developed prior to the 1954 Code, and was used by the Commissioner in
efforts to tax the liquidation-reincorporation, at least to some extent, at
ordinary income tax rates. See note 10 supra and cases cited therein. In
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (194.5), the Court
stated that "the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a
transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of
property are not finally to be determined solely by the means employed to
transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction must be viewed as a whole, and
each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the consummation of
the sale, is relevant." Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315
U.S. 179 (1942), is an oft cited case in this area. There the Court ad-
monished that there could be no segregation of steps when they were all
taken as integrated parts of a single scheme; and in Southwell Combing Co.,
30 T.C. 487, 497-98 (1958), the court said "it is well settled that where a
transaction is comprised of a series of interdependent steps, that is to say,
where the legal relationships created by any one step would have been fruit-
less without the completion of the entire series, the various steps are to be
integrated into one for the purpose of arriving at the tax consequences of the
transaction. . .. [I]t is the situation at the beginning and the end of the
series which determines whether there has been a statutory reorganization
or merely a taxable exchange." See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531
(1941); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938); Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 835 (1959); Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955); Fisher v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d
707 (6th Cir. 1939); Ahles Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1934); William M. Liddon, 22 T.C. 1220 (1954), reversed on other grounds,
230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); Richard
H. Survaunt, 5 T.C. 665 (1945), aff'd, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947).
The step-transaction doctrine, however, has not had universal application.
See United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 828 (1953), where the assets of the dissolved corporation went through
trustees at the direction of the old stockholders, with the trustees then re-
ceiving stock in a new corporation. The stock was distributed to the old
shareholders as beneficiaries of the trust. The circuit court held that there
was not a reorganization because there was not a corporation-to-corporation
transfer of the assets. The court here refused to adopt the theory of Fisher
v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1939). In Fisher the passage of the
assets through intervening hands did not prevent the court from finding a
reorganization, holding the intervenors to be merely "conduits." In agree-
ment with the Arcade Co. case is Braicks v. Henricksen, 43 F. Supp. 254
(W.D. Wash. 1942), aft'd, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943).
See generally PAUL & ZIMET, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION
200-54 (2d Series 1938); Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate
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ganization takes place "only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or
securities of the corporation to which the assets are transferred are
distributed in a transaction which qualifies under section 354... or
356."'' i Under section 35419 the selling or transferring corporation
is required to transfer "substantially all"2 of its assets to the buying
Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAx 247 (1954); Rice, Jvdicial
Techniques lit Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 1021, 1046
(1953).
"8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D). This requirement is new
in the Internal Revue Code of 1954. Section 1 12(g) (1) (D) of the
1939 Code, predecessor of the present section, provided "a transfer by a
corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately
after the transfer the transferor or its shareholders are both in control of
the corporation to which the assets are transferred" is a "D" reorganization.
The 1954 addition serves to restrict the "D" reorganization.
1 9"(a) ....
(1) .... No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in
a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation
or in another corporation a party to the reorganization ....
(b) Exc prioN.-
(1) .... Subsection (a) shall not apply to an exchange in pursu-
ance of a plan of reorganization within the meaning of section 368(a) (1) (D),
unless-
(A) the corporation to which the assets are transferred ac-
quires substantially all of the assets of the transferor of such assets; and
(B) the stock, securities, and other properties received by such
transferor, as well as the other properties of such transferor, are distributed
in pursuance of the plan of reorganization." INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 354.
Section 354 "does not appear to apply to the divisive or corporate separa-
tion type of reorganization." MERTENS, CoDE COMMENTARY, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION § 354(b) :1 (1955).
"0 Section 368(a) (1) (D) states that there must be a transfer of "all or
a part of its assets to another corporation." However, this must be read in
conjunction with section 354(b) (1) (A), which requires a transfer of "sub-
stantially all of the assets of the transferor.... " "The requirement that sub-
stantially all of the assets of the transferor go over to the transferee and that
the transferor distribute all of its assets remaining, plus the stock, securities
or other properties received upon the transfer to the transferee ... appears
designed to insure first that a reincorporation was substantially intended, and
secondly that any money or other 'boot' assets will be taxed as such by reason
of the required distribution in connection with the plan of reorganization."
MERTENS, CODE COMMENTARY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 354(b):1
(1955). In The Daily Tel. Co., 34 B.T.A. 101, 105 (1936), the court stated
that "the term 'substantially all' is a relative term, dependent on the facts
of any given situation," and in Gross v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.
1937), reversing 34 B.T.A. 395 (1936), the court held that substantially
all of the assets included properties useful in the business. This was found
to mean such cash as was needful for working capital, but "substantially all"
did not include surplus cash distributed to shareholders of the old corpora-
tion. See Britt v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1940) ; Commissioner
v. First Natl Bank, 104 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1939); Schuh Trading Co. v.
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or transferee corporation. The section, in addition, provides that "no
gain or loss shall be recognized if stock... [is] exchanged solely
for stock"21 of another corporation in pursuance of a plan of reor-
ganization. Under section 356,22 when other property or money is
received in addition to stock on such an exchange, the gain is to be
recognized in an amount not in excess of the value of the property
received. Section 356 also provides that when a distribution in such
an exchange has the effect of a dividend, such gain is to be treated
as a dividend to the extent that accumulated earnings and profits
are distributed.
2 3
Thus, in Grubbs, B and G had voting control24 of both transferor
Commissioner, 95 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1938); Pillar Rock Packing Co. v.
Commissioner, 90 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1937); Western Indus. Co. v. Helver-
ing, 82 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ; Wellington Fund, Inc., 4 T.C. 185 (1944);
Milton Smith, 34 B.T.A. 702 (1936); Alice V. St. Onge, 31 B.T.A. 295
(1934); Arctic Ice Mach. Co., 23 B.T.A. 1223 (1931).
"The fact that properties retained by the transferor corporation, or re-
ceived in exchange for the properties transferred in the reorganization, are
used to satisfy existing liabilities not represented by securities and which
were incurred in the ordinary course of business before the reorganization
does not prevent the application of section 354 to an exchange pursuant to a
plan of reorganization defined in section 368(a) (1) (D)." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.354-1(a) (2) (1955).
21INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §354(a)(1).
*' (a) GAIN ON EXCHANGES.-
(1) RECOGNITION OF GAINIf-
(A) section 354 .. would apply to an exchange but for the
fact that
(B) the property received in the exchange consists not only of
property permitted by section 354 ... to be received without the recognition
of gain but also of other property or money,
then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount
not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such
other property.
(2) TREATMENT AS DIVIDEND.-If an exchange is described in
paragraph (1) but has the effect of the distribution of a dividend, then there
shall be treated as a dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain
recognized under paragraph (1) as is not in excess of his ratable share of
the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated after
February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain recognized under
paragraph (1) shall be treated as gain from the exchange of property."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 356.
2' Quoted in part note 22 supra. See Commissioner v. Bedford, 325 U.S.
283 (1945). See generally Darrell, The Scope of Commissioner v. Bedford
Estate, 24 TAxEs 266 (1946); Horrow, Recent Developments in Corporate
Reorganizations, U. So. CAL. 1963 TAx INsT. 251, 268; Wittenstein, Boot
Distributions aid Section 112(c)(2): A Reexamination, 8 TAx L. REV. 63
(1952).
2' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c), defines control as "the ownership of
stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all
19641
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and transferee corporations. The plan of reorganization was ar-
ranged to permit continuation of the corporate business in the new
corporate cloak with "no break in the continuity of the proprietary
interest."25 The transferee corporation received all of the assets of
the transferring corporation, and there was a distribution of trans-
feree's stock in pursuance of the plan of reorganization. 2 The situa-
classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation."
" 39 T.C. No. 5 at 8. The doctrine of "continuity of interest" is a judicial
concept which has been picked up in the regulations. Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(b)
(1955), states that "requisite to a reorganization under the Code [is] ...
a continuity of interest therein on the part of those persons who, directly
or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise prior to the reorganization."
In Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470
(1933), the Court stated that to be within the reorganization provisions "the
seller must acquire an interest in the affairs of the purchasing company more
definite than that incident to ownership of its short-term purchase-money
notes." Thus, continuity of interest involves acquiring an interest in the
affairs of the purchasing company or corporation. This doctrine is involved
in the precept that mere compliance with the statutory reorganization pro-
visions is not enough, the requirement of this judicial concept must be met.
The doctrine dates back to Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d
937 (2d Cir. 1932), where the court held that although there had been literal
compliance with the reorganization statutes, the transfer of substantially all
of its properties by a corporation for short-term promissory notes and cash
was too much like a sale, and without a continuance of interest by the seller
no reorganization existed. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940);
Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387 (1935); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co.,
296 U.S. 378 (1935); John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374
(1935); Alan 0. Hickok, 32 T.C. 80 (1959). It should be noted that this
judicial concept is somewhat obviated because of the statutory control re-
quirement in § 368(c) (80 per cent), quoted in part note 24 supra. See
generally 3 MERTENS, FFDERAL IcomE TAXATION § 20.59 (rev. ed. 1957);
Baker, Continuity of Interest Requirement in Reorganizations Reexamined-
The Hickok Case, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. oN FED. TAx 761 (1960); Brookes,
The Continuity of Interest Test in Reorganizations-A Blessing or a Curse,
34 CALIF. L. Rv. 1 (1946); Griswold, Securities and Continuity of Interest,
58 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1945).
"The language of § 354(b) (1) (B), quoted in part note 19 supra, im-
plies that there should be a complete liquidation before the transaction can
qualify under section 354, as required by section 368(a) (1) (D) for a statu-
tory reorganization. We do not quite have that situation in Grubbs since the
transferor corporation received a note from transferee for the amount of
B's ratable share. B still held his stock in transferor which he planned to
use in its corporate form in the financing business. The contention was made
that this failure to make an actual distribution to B made the distributions
substantially disproportionate within §302(b)(2) as regards the share-
holders. If such a contention were sustained the distributions would quali-
fy as "exchanges"; however, the court found that since B was the sole stock-
holder remaining in transferor, and that since the corporation had received
his pro rata share of the distribution, they (the court) had no control over
what form B chose to take his distribution in, and that actually he had re-
ceived his pro rata share of the distributions. Thus, there was no dispro-
[Vol. 42
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tion in Grubbs squarely meets the requirements for a statutory "D"
reorganization. Accordingly the Commissioner successfully asserted
that the corporation-to-corporation transfer was tax-free with the
result that no stepped-up basis was obtained for the operating assets
transferred, and that the distributions of additional compensation or
"boot" were taxable as in the nature of an ordinary dividend to the
extent that they came out of accumulated earnings and profits, under
the provisions of section 356.27
In Gallaghers the facts present a basically similar problem; how-
ever, the main contention of the Commissioner and the result in the
case are different from those in Grubbs. In Gallagher the old cor-
poration had been incorporated in Delaware in 1946, and from that
time until its dissolution in 1955 it had been engaged in the general
stevedoring and terminal business in certain ports on the west coast.
It had in excess of 900,000 dollars in accumulated earnings and
profits. The Delaware corporation owned the equipment used in
the business but no real estate. The shareholders of the corporation
were divided into two distinct groups: (1) the active shareholders
(officers and directors), who owned approximately 62 per cent of the
outstanding stock, and (2) the inactive shareholders (estates and
widows), who held the remaining 38 per cent.
During 1955 the active shareholders formed a new corporation
under the laws of California with the same name as that of the old
Delaware corporation. The active shareholders received 72 and %
per cent of the new corporation's stock, with the remaining 27 and %
per cent being issued to employees of the old corporation who were
considered "key" and who, prior to this time, had had no equity
ownership in the business. The shareholders paid 300,000 dollars in
cash for the new corporation's stock. The old corporation, in ac-
cordance with a plan of complete liquidation, thereupon sold its
operating assets to the new corporation for cash. The old corporation
was then liquidated, with a subsequent distribution of its assets in-
cluding the cash received from the new corporation as proceeds from
the sale. The taxpayers "treated the liquidating distributions...
as part or full payment in exchange for their stock and reported the
portionate distribution. This "piercing of the corporate veil" seems justified
and does no harm to the statute.
'7 Quoted in part note 22 supra; see also authorities cited note 23 supra.
28 Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. No. 13 (Oct. 17, 1962).
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amounts received in excess of the adjusted basis as long-term capital
gains.
' 29
The Commissioner asserted a deficiency, insisting that the distri-
butions "received... [are] taxable in full as dividend income."8
The Commissioner based his contention on two alternative argu-
ments: (1) that, in substance, a partial or complete liquidation did
not occur and that therefore amounts "received by the individual
consisted of a dividend within the purview of section 301..
or (2) that there was a statutory "reorganization within the mean-
ing of section 368... ,"32 in which case the cash distributions would
be treated as "boot" under section 356 and taxed as ordinary in-
come to the extent attributable to accumulated earnings and profits.
The court, however, found that a partial liquidation had in fact oc-
curred. Thus the court respects the liquidation of the old corporation
and the distributions in question receive sale or exchange treatment.
The court felt that, although the Commissioner did "not spe-
cifically refer to section 302, the implication appears to be that the
redemption.., was essentially equivalent to a dividend under section
302(b) (1)"I' and was thus "not to be treated as a capital transac-
tion under section 302(a), but as a dividend under section 301(c)-
(1), with ordinary income consequences.""4 The court stated that
"there can be no doubt that the stock... was redeemed."8 5 How-
ever, "the redemption was only one step in what was undoubtedly a
29Id. at 11.
80 Ibid.
" Id. at 11-12. INT. REV. CoDE op 1954, § 301, provides, inter alia, for the
inclusion in gross income a distribution by a corporation which is a "divi-
dend."
d. at 12. It is interesting to note that apparently the Commissioner did
not specify which type of reorganization he meant.
" Ibid. INT. Rtv. CODE OF 1954, § 302 provides "(a) .... If a corporation
redeems its stock..., and if paragraph (1), (2), (3) ... of subsection (b)
applies, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full
payment in exchange for the stock.
(b) ....
(1) .... Subsection (a) shall apply if the redemption is not es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend.
(2) ....
(A) .... Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution is sub-
stantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder ....
(3) .... Subsection (a) shall apply if the redemption is in com-
plete redemption of all of the stock of the corporation owned by the share-
holder."
3'39 T.C. No. 13 at 12.
15 Id. at 13.
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liquidation-reincorporation operation .... -" The court thus invokes
the step-transaction theory and consequently the reorganization pro-
visions of the Code.87  The Commissioner, however, wanted the
liquidation of the old corporation ignored, with the transaction being
tested solely as a redemption. But the Commissioner had not made
it clear whether he supported his main contention with the rationale
of Bazley v. Commissioner s and Gregory v. Helvering.I
Bazley involved a recapitalization 0 which fitted the literal re-
quirements of the statute. However, in that case the Supreme Court
held that "a 'reorganization' which is merely a vehicle, however
elaborate or elegant, for conveying earnings from accumulations to
the stockholders is not a reorganization under [the statute] . .. ,,4
Bazley was preceded by the Gregory case. There the Court held that
the formation of a new corporation merely for the purpose of en-
abling stockholders to receive distributions (upon its subsequent
liquidation) as liquidating instead of as ordinary dividends, and
where no "business purpose"' was served, is not a reorganization
"Ibid. The court gives Grubbs as authority here.
", "The concept of a continuation of the existing business through a sec-
tion 331 liquidation, coupled with an intercorporate transfer, falls into the
general area of corporate reorganizations, so that it is in the so-called re-
organization sections, if anywhere, that we should expect it to be dealt with."
39 T.C. No. 13 at 14. See note 17 supra and cases cited therein.
" 331 U.S. 737, rehearing denied and prior opinion amended 332 U.S.
752 (1947).
o293 U.S. 465 (1935).
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 1 12(g) (1) (E), 53 Stat. 40 (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (E)).
" 331 U.S. 737, 743 (1947).
2 "Business purpose" is the second of two judicial concepts (for the first,
"continuity of interest," see note 25 supra). The "business purpose" concept
developed out of the case of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935),
wherein the formation of a second corporation, transfer of certain securities
to it, and its subsequent liquidation were found to be without business sub-
stance and entered into solely for the purpose of tax advantage for a major
stockholder. In that case the Court held that although the transaction met
the literal requirements of the reorganization statute, there was in reality
no reorganization and the distributions of the second corporation, upon its
liquidation, were ordinary dividends instead of liquidating distributions.
The "business purpose" doctrine is mainly aimed at the "sham" or "merely
for tax avoidance" transaction. It was further developed in Bazley v. Com-
missioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947), and has been tabbed the "net effect" test,
i.e., what is the net effect of the transaction? See Liddon v. Commissioner,
230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1956).
A refinement of this doctrine is acknowledged by Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (b)
(1955), providing that "requisite to a reorganization under the Code [is]
... a continuity of the business enterprise under the modified corporate
form .... " The regulation appears to be aimed at the situation where reor-
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within the intent of the statute. The effect of the decision was to
ignore the formation and liquidation of the second corporation and
to treat the distributions as ordinary dividends.
The Commissioner desired that the court "judge not according
to the appearance,"4 but find that the liquidation of the old corpora-
tion was in substance not a liquidation "although it literally com-
plied with all the terms, because the transaction is alleged to have
been primarily a vehicle for the distribution of undistributed earn-
ings."44 The court stated, however, that unlike the recapitalization-
reorganization "involved in Basley and similar cases, liquidation is
usually accompanied by some kind of distribution which may well
include accumulated earnings of the liquidating corporation."4
The court noted that complete liquidation is not defined in the
Code or the regulations, and concluded that a complete liquidation
exists only when there is not a partial liquidation. Under section
346(a) (1) a distribution in partial liquidation occurs if "the distri-
bution is one of a series of distributions in redemption of all of the
stock of the corporation pursuant to a plan... "4" Thus, the court
held that the distributions made by the old corporation fell within
ganization treatment is sought and there is no intention to continue in busi-
ness. The requirement is that there be a continuity in the business activity,
not necessarily that the identical or a closely related business activity be en-
gaged in. Bentsen v. Phinny, 199 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Scott,
Recent Developments in the Federal Income Tax Laws-A Selective Survey
of Recent Judicial Decisions, 41 N.C.L. Rv. 783, 822 (1963).
Thus, under the "business purpose" doctrine, the court must find that the
transaction has a valid business purpose, and also that there is an intention
to continue the business in modified corporate form, although it does not
have to be the same business which was being conducted prior to the reor-
ganization.
In Gallagher "the following were some of the corporate business reasons
for liquidating [the transferor] ... :to eliminate the inactive estates and
widows... from the business; to permit Gallagher to acquire more stock
so that Bush and Gallagher could control the business; to bring into stock
ownership seven or eight executives who had helped in making a success of
[the transferor] ... ; to limit Cuffe's ownership of the business." 39 T.C.
No. 13 at 10. Business purpose did not really enter into the coures decision
in Gallagher, although it recognized those listed as constituting valid business
reasons for the transaction as carried out. Wolf Envelope Co., 17 T.C. 471
(1951); Marjorie N. Dean, 10 T.C. 19 (1948). The court stated that it
rested "the conclusion that there was no reorganization here on the form
and content of the reorganization sections, not on the ground that there was
no business purpose" for the transaction. 39 T.C. No. 13 at 19.
"John 7:24 (King James).
"39 T.C. No. 13 at 15.
,Ibid.
"INT. REV. CoDE or 1954, § 346(a) (1).
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the literal provisions of section 346, even though the series of distri-
butions completely liquidated the old corporation. The provisions of
section 331 (a) (2) are applicable, and provide "that amounts distrib-
uted in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in part
or full payment in exchange for the stock. This carries as a natural
corollary that such amounts shall not be treated as dividends." '47
The court supported its position that the distributions should not
receive ordinary dividend treatment by noting that the instant situa-
tion fell within the terms of section 346(a) (1), and that such a
distribution in redemption of all the stock can never be essentially
equivalent to a dividend, since Congress included in section 346(a)
(2) language taxing distributions "essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend" but omitted this language from section 346(a) (1).48
In finally disposing of the Commissioner's main contention the
court stated:
[W]e have been referred to no authority, either under the 1954
Code or under the less restrictive language of the preceding revenue
acts, in which a liquidation-reincorporation has been held to give
rise to ordinary income, except where that result could be accom-
plished by applying the provisions relating to reorganizations. 9
After thus indicating that it would deal with this type of situation
only under the reorganization provisions, the court summarily dis-
posed of Commissioner's alternative contention that a reorganiza-
tion had taken place. Utilizing the step-transaction theory made it
possible to see this manipulation as an acquisition of the old corpora-
tion's assets by the new corporation for voting stock. However, the
Commissioner did not urge that there was a "C" reorganization,
presumably because there was a cash payment to the retiring stock-
holders (38 per cent)." Although liquidation-reincorporations are
' Fowler Hosiery Co., 36 T.C. 201, 222 (1961), aff'd, 301 F.2d 394 (7th
Cir. 1962).Quoted in part note 6 supra.
39 T.C. No. 13 at 17.to "(a) ....
(1) ... the term 'reorganization' means ...
(C) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for
all or a part of its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part
of the voting stock of a corporation which is in control of the acquir-
ing corporation), of substantially all of the properties of another cor-
poration ..... " INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C). See Helvering v.
Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, rehearing denied, 315 U.S. 829,
second petition for rehearing denied, 316 U.S. 710 (1942).
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usually attacked under the type "D" reorganization provision,51
the Commissioner renounced that provision in Gallagher because the
shareholders of transferee who were also shareholders of the trans-
feror did not have the requisite eighty per cent control required for
such a reorganization.52 In further dealing with Commissioner's re-
organization argument, the court stated that there was not an "E"
reorganization 3 because "there was not that reshuffling of a capital
structure, within the framework of an existing corporation, contem-
plated by the term 'recapitalization.' ,54 "And the shift that occurred
in the proprietary interest of the two corporations was hardly the
'mere change in identity, form or place of organization' 5 required
for an "F" reorganization." There being no other available possi-
bilities under the reorganization provisions, the Commissioner was
defeated by the court's literal application of the statute.
These two decisions, Grubbs and Gallagher, point out several
things. First, that when a transaction involves the transfer of sub-
stantially all the assets of a corporation to a new corporation 80 per
cent or more controlled by the transferor or its shareholders, and
there is a liquidation of the transferring corporation with distribu-
tions of its remaining liquid assets and cash, plus stock in the new
corporation, to the original corporation's shareholders, the step-
transaction theory will be invoked with the court finding a reorgani-
5 See note 10 supra and cases cited therein.
' IxT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c), quoted in part note 24 supra.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (E) (recapitalization).
" Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. No. 13 at 18, quoting Helvering v. South-
west Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942). See also Stollberg Hardware
Co., 46 B.T.A. 788 (1942).
S39 T.C. No. 13 at 18.
"' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (F). The Gallagher holding as
pertains to the possibility of an "E" or an "F" reorganization squarely con-
flicts with the position taken by the Commissioner in REv. RUL. 61-156,
1961-2 Cum. BuLL. 62. In this ruling the Commissioner states that the
transfer of substantially all of the liquidating corporation's assets to trans-
feree in exchange for cash, notes and 45 per cent of transferee's stock con-
stitutes an "E" or an "F" reorganization. In spite of the fact that the Com-
missioner finds a reorganization here, he holds that the cash and notes re-
ceived by the shareholders is to be treated as a dividend under section 301,
rather than as additional compensation under section 356. The Commissioner
cites Treas. Reg. 1.331-1(c) (1955), as authority for taxing this "reorgani-
zation" under section 301 (see note 68 infra). However, it is clearly held
in Gallagher that the Tax Court will not look favorably upon such reasoning,
and that it is not supported by the statutory provisions. See generally Bau-
man, New Clouds on the Liquidation Horizon, 48 A.B.A.J. 182 (1962).
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zation under section 368 (a) (1) (D) .57 Second, if we have essentially
the same transaction as stated above with a failure to meet the exact,
literal requirements of section 368, e.g., statutory control is not in
the remaining shareholders of transferor, but there is a valid "busi-
ness purpose" shown by the taxpayers, then a partial or complete
liquidation will be found." Third, a question is raised as to how the
court might hold if it were presented with a similar transfer, and
with the literal requirements of section 368 (a) again not met, and
with no valid business purpose shown for the transaction. In such
a transaction the taint of tax avoidance becomes more extreme.
Fourth, the divergent tax results of two cases so alike in economic
effect illustrates how badly corrective legislation is needed in this
area.
59
The import of the decision in Gallagher may be to confine the
Commissioner's attack on liquidation-reincorporation transactions
to the reorganization provisions of the 1954 Code. 0 However, it
" Thus the corporation-to-corporation transfer would be tax-free and the
new corporation, under section 362(b), would take the assets transferred at
the same basis at which the old corporation held them. However, the distri-
butions to the old corporation's shareholders will be taxable, under section
356, to the extent of gain "but not in excess of the sum of such money and
the fair market value of the such other property" which is distributed. To
the extent that the distribution of other property and cash is attributable to
accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation, it is taxable as a divi-
dend under section 356 (a) (2). This is in accord with pre-54 decisions.
See note 10 supra and cases cited therein.
" This results in the transferee corporation, under sections 334 and
362(a), receiving the assets of transferor at a stepped-up basis (fair market
value), and the distributions of cash and any other remaining assets to the
transferor's shareholders at capital gain rates, under section 331, as distribu-
tions in liquidation.
"A comparison of the results in Grubbs and Gallagher does not seem to
show a sense of justice and fairness in the application of the revenue laws,
when the difference in taxability of two transactions which are basically the
same is based on so narrow a thread.
"'The Law is the true embodiment
Of everything that's excellent.
It has no kind of fault or flaw,'
Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's
Balancing Test, 76 HARv. L. REv. 755, 772 n.26 (1963), quoting GILBERT
AND SULLIVAN, IOLANTHE, AcT I.
"See Note, 32 U. CINc. L. Rnv. 416 (1963). An appeal of Gallagher
to the Ninth Circuit has been dismissed. It is reasonable to assume that the
government did not perfect its appeal and is waiting for a case whose facts
will better present the Commissioner's position. It is interesting to note that
the Ninth Circuit has held contra to the Commissioner's position in Braicks
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is not likely that the Commissioner will cease in his efforts to use
the reincorporation theory to limit the concept of complete liquida-
tion. It would seem that the distinction between the holding in
United States v. General Geophysical Co.6 and the Bazley-Gregory
2
approach might provide the Commissioner with a platform from
which to proceed.
In General Geophysical the company had transferred certain de-
preciable assets, with a tax basis of 170,000 dollars and a fair mar-
ket value of 750,000 dollars, to two of its major stockholders. Sev-
eral hours later the company reacquired the assets giving in exchange
the company's notes in the amount of 750,000 dollars. The issue
in this case was whether or not the company reacquired the assets
at a stepped-up basis for purposes of depreciation. There was no
question here of the validity of the business purpose involved and
the court accepted the contention that the transaction was not
prompted by a motive of tax avoidance.6 3 In holding that there was
not a sufficient interruption in the ownership of the assets to create
a new basis, the court stated:
[TJax avoidance implications do not constitute a license to courts
to distort the laws or to write in new provisions; they do mean
that we should guard against giving force to a purported transfer
which gives off an unmistakably hollow sound when it is tapped.
It is a hollow sound for tax purposes; here, we are not concerned
with business purpose or the legal effectiveness of the transaction
under [state law] ....
Thus, in General Geophysical we see a decision which does not ques-
tion the validity of a transaction for other than tax purposes when
there is a valid business purpose involved. However, the court does
not allow this to interfere with a proper and just result under the
federal revenue laws.
v. Henricksen, 43 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Wash. 1942), aft'd, 137 F.2d 632
(9th Cir. 1943).
296 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing denied 296 F.2d 90 (5th
Cir. 1961).
' See text accompanying notes 40-44 supra. See generally Bierman &
Silverstein (chairmen), Substance vs. Form in Corporate Activities: A
Series of Panel Discussions, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX 975 (1962);
Cuddihy, The Misuse of "Substance" v. "Fori", U. So. CAL. 1963 TAX
INST. 653.
" The transaction was carried out in the form illustrated so that the re-
tiring stockholders would not be liable should the corporation become bank-
rupt. 296 F.2d at 87.01296 F.2d at 89.
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In addition, and notwithstanding the Gallagher decision, the
Bazley-Gregory approach cannot yet be counted out in this area. It
would seem.to provide the correct result in a case where'the transac-
tion was not made for a valid business purpose. In such a case the
transaction would have, been more clearly made for the purpose of
tax avoidance and the court should have no difficulty in holding that
such a "sham" transaction should be denied the dignity of a judicial
holding that it is valid. as regards the federal revenue laws. The
"substance and realities" of the situation would prevent the court's
giving effect to such a transaction36
The statutory route must now be recognized as the most effective
way to remove the problem created in this .area by the 1954 Code.
The purpose and intent of the revenue laws, although the present
statutory provisions do not so provide, seem to require that share-
holders continuing in an incorporated enterprise after a liquidation
be taxed at ordinary income tax rates, to the extent that the distri-
butions come out of accumulated earnings and profits without regard
to the percentage of ownership retained by the continuing share-
holder.60
The House of Representatives' version of the statute later en-
acted as the 1954 Code contained a section which was designed to
deal with liquidations followed -by reincorporations. 7 The proposed
section was not enacted, and the managers of the bill in the House
indicated that they, thought tax avoidance possibilities in this area
were not. great, and that if such possibilities did present themselves
"There is a strong dissent based on this- argument in Gallagher,'39 T.C.
No. 13 at 20.
" Most suggested legislation in this area uses fifty per cent as the cut-off
point. That is in order to come under the liquidation-reincorporation pro-
visions it is generally thought that the continuing shareholder(s) should have
at least fifty per cent of the equity in the transferee corporation. However, it
would seem that there are many instances when less than that amount would
justify taxation as an ordinary dividend when the minority shareholder(s)
remains in the corporate enterprise as a result of a "plan of reorganization"
or liquidation. It does not seem improbable that a properly drawn statute,
depending on substance rather than form, could provide for such transactions.
See generally MacLean, Problems of Reincorporation and Related Proposals
of the Subchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAx L. REv. 407- (1958); see note
9 supra.
"H. R. 8300, 83d CoNG., 2d SEss. § 357 (1954). In noting this, the court
in Gallagher said that for them to find a reorganizatii would be to "enact
that provision which has failed on two separate occasions to be enacted by
Congress." 39 T.C. No. 13 at 20.
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the judiciary or the regulations could handle the problem by utilizing
other provisions of the Code. Unfortunately, the conference commit-
tee report by the managers for the House did not indicate which
provisions of the Code were meant.6 From the vantage point of
hindsight we are able to see that judicial gloss and administrative
provisions cannot, in every case, remove the difficulties caused by
legislative oversight.69 At this point it may be said that:
[T]he House committee wore rose-tinted glasses, which made im-
penetrable the darker implications, when it concluded that the
"liquidation and reincorporation" problem could be solved by ex-
pedients other than legislation. A lack of judicial harmony pre-
vails in the area and the 1954 Code fails to mitigate the resulting
unfortunate situation.70
We are at an untenable cross-roads in this area. The law con-
cerning liquidation-reincorporation transactions is uncertain and
open to abuse. This uncertainty may well produce unjust tax re-
sults in the litigation which will probably result before there are
sufficient judicial precedents to provide the government and the tax-
payer with acceptably definite guidance. Thus, it appears that it is
" H. R. REP. No. 2543, 83d CONG., 2d SEss. 41 (1954).
The Commissioner sought to utilize what he took to be the "legislative
intent" of the Congress on this problem and issued regulations under both
sections 301 and 331 of the 1954 Code dealing with the problems in this area.
Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (1) (1955), provides that "a distribution to shareholders
with respect to their stock is within the terms of section 301 although it takes
place at the same time as another transaction if the distribution is in sub-
stance a separate transaction whether or not connected in a formal sense.
This is most likely to occur in the case of... a reincorporation .. .." And in
Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1955), the Commissioner states "a liquidation
which is followed by a transfer to another corporation of all or part of the
assets of the liquidating corporation or which is preceded by such a transfer
may, however, have the effect of the distribution of a dividend or of a trans-
action in which no loss is recognized and gain is recognized only to the extent
of 'other property.'"
In Gallagher, application of the step-transaction theory avoided Treas.
Reg. § 1.301-1 (1), since it requires "in substance a separate transaction .... "
While in the opinion the court said that since there was no reorganization on
the facts presented, Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1 (c) would not apply because it merely
adopts the holding of Richard H. Survaunt, 5 T.C. 665 (1945), a case in-
volving a liquidation-reincorporation wherein a "D" reorganization was found
by the court. 39 T.C. at 19. These pronouncements by the Commissioner
would seem to be ineffective indeed when read in the light of the Gallagher
decision.
" MERTENS, CODE COMMENTARY, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 368 (a) -
(1) (D) :1 at 253 (1955).
" Bakst, Does Dissolution Followed by Reincorporation Constitute a Re-
organization?, 33 TAxES 815, 822 (1955).
[Vol. 42
NOTES AND COMMENTS
up to the Congress to erect the signs that are necessary to facilitate
predictable passage through this cross-roads.
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Survey of the United States Supreme Court Decisions Affecting
Labor-Management Relations During the 1962-1963 Term*
The labor law decisions of the Supreme Court during the 1962-
1963 term were primarily significant in clarifying perennial labor
issues. The Court was faced with many recurring problems-juris-
diction of the National Labor Relations Board, federal court pre-
emption, rights under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, and a
union's use of dues for political contributions-and it resolutely
drafted new guidelines in an attempt to clarify the existing com-
plexity. But the Court was not entirely relegated to redefining the
old problems as it also was called upon for its initial construction of
recent significant developments such as the agency shop agreement
and superseniority to strike replacements.
The Court took final action on eighty-four labor cases during the
term. Twenty-two of these cases were disposed of by opinion, sixty
were denied review, one was reversed upon grant of review, and one
was remanded with directions to dismiss as moot. The following is
a summary of those twenty-two cases on which the Court granted
review.
I. JURISDICTION OF THE NLRB
The National Labor Relations Board receives its authority from
Congress by way of the National Labor Relations Act.' The power
' For thorough presentations on the problems herein discussed, and many
related problems, see Grubb, Corporate Manipulations Under Subchapter C:
Reincorporation-Liquidation, 28 U. CINc. L. Rav. 304 (1959); Kuhn, Liqui-
dation and Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code, 51 GEo. L.J. 96 (1962);
MacLean, Problens of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the Sub-
chapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAx L. REV. 407 (1958); Schwartz, Rein-
corporation Under The 1954 Code, 15 U. FLA. L. Rv. 159 (1962).
The author acknowledges use of Happer, "The Liquidation-Reincorpora-
tion Problem" (unpublished seminar paper, University of North Carolina
School of Law, May 1963), as an aid in research. The opinions of that
paper do not appear herein except in such case as they coincide with those
of the author.
* The author would like to express his sincere appreciation to Professor
Daniel H. Pollitt for the encouragement and guidance given in the prepara-
tion of this paper.
'National Labor Relations Act § 3(a), added by 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as
amended, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. III, 1962).
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